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Abstract 
“Corruption is detected because it is harder to be hidden”. 
Susan Rose- Ackerman 
The long-term experience of democratic states around the world on the war against corruption 
has revealed the need of implementing active provision for the reinforcement of the detection 
and punishment of corruptive activities. The survival and the “metastasis of corruption cancer” 
favored maximally by the absence of monitoring the behavior of the state officials, using 
corruption indicators presented in this study. We propose a set of precautions which will make 
possible to a great extent the detection of the corruptive activities committed by the officials in 
the public sector. Therefore, this study is useful to the Albanian Republic Government in order to 
effectively fight the actual corruptive system, especially in the economy, juridical system, 
ministries, health system, municipalities and Albanian universities. The implementation of this 
study might change in a few years the perception of corruption from “an activity with less risk 
and greater economic benefit” into “an activity with great risk and zero economic benefit”. This 
study needs to be applied as soon as possible especially in the areas where the system of 
corruption is destroying the economic development and impeding the functioning of main state 
institutions (e.g. customs, tax offices, ownership rights and appropriations, ministries, 
municipalities, law courts and offices of state attorneys, universities, etc.).We develop a 
mathematical model for calculating the probability of detecting corruption of public sector 
officials by monitoring their behavior by a set containing 47 indicators. There are two types of 
corruption indicators: neutral indicators and specifics indicators. These indicators are considered 
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acceptable by Scientific Research in Criminology, as well by the general social opinion. The 
indicators of corruption provide different contributions in the detection and punishment of 
corruptive activities, some of these indicators are more important than others. We associate each 
indicator with corresponding probability, that the official monitored will be corrupted. The 
detection of corruption through monitoring the behavior of public sector officials by indicators is 
a scientific method, which combines contemporary achievements of the Scientific Research in 
Criminology with Probability Theory. This scientific method is powerful and general, because it 
can be applied in different fields: economy, judicial system, education system and in each time 
period. The indicators of corruption implicate real life facts; they are not simply assumptions or 
hypotheses. The main results of the study include the formulas (1) – (4).  
Key Words: Corruption, Detection, Indicators, Monitoring, Probability. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Corruption has always been an obvious and recurring phenomenon throughout the human 
history. It has been present in all the socio-political systems of different levels and forms. The 
Hamurabi Code specifies penalties based on the law against corrupted employees, especially 
against corrupted judges. In the fourth century B.C. Kaulitiliya, the prime minister of the 
Kingdom of India, has written the book Arathasatra, in where he has discussed about corruption. 
Aristotel, Plato, Tuqidhidhi, Makiavelli and Russo have all studied the government corruption. 
Dante has placed the corrupted officials in the deepest circle of hell, thus displaying the medieval 
abomination for the corrupted people. Shakespeare has given corruption a prominent place in 
some of his plays. The American Constitution considers bribe as a pure crime, which justifies the 
charges against the President of America. Well-known politicians (presidents, prime ministers, 
minuisters) have lost their positions because of the corruption and in rare cases; political classes 
have been replaced entirely.Corruption is an evil activity that is caused by a psycho-social lack 
of the norms of human behavior that aims at producing illegal benefits for one person or his/her 
family, friends, or political allies.  Corruption is a multi-dimensional concept or a group of 
concepts with supplementary meanings that are part of the economic, political, psychological, 
and mathematical sciences. According to the public meaning, corruption means abuse of the 
government position to benefit non-governmental advantages. The catalogue of the corruptive 
activities includes bribe, threat, use of power, embezzlement, fraud, favoritism, payment of 
money, nepotism, etc. Corruption exists not only in the government sector, but also in the 
international organizations. A human activity, whether in the public or private, America or Italy, 
Japan or Russia, has tendencies to become a corruptive activity if one person (or a group of 
people) has monopolized the power over an item, good or service, is free to judge, act and decide 
on the offer and price of this good or service and this person (or group of people) is not 
accountable to anyone (is not responsible) for this activity. Metaphorically,  
K = M + L – P, 
where K denotes the corruption. M denotes the monopolization of the power. L denotes the 
freedom of judgment and action, and P denotes the responsibility or accountability. The 
improvement of government is crucial for the essential economic development of a country and 
for the increase of the life standard of poor people. But these main objectives are threatened by 
corruption. The good government program has at the center the anticorruption strategy. (see [1], 
[2], [9]) . We must never underestimate the need that corruption has for the political power 
support. Corruption is assisted and promoted by the same party brought in power position for a 
long time. Distinguished scientists in the theory of corruption (S. Rose- Ackerman, R. E. 
Klitgaard, etc) have argued that corruption present in the countries in transition that have weak 
political institutions, and relatively weak administrations. In these conditions, the corruption can 
be transformed into a system, according to the meaning of the Applied Systems Analysis. This 
means that the system of corruption must be fought against through the anticorruption system 
(see [4], [5], [8], [9]).  
A typical case studied by Professor R. E. Klitgaard is the systematic corruption in the countries 
in transition, where the leading party in power and the opposing party are temporarily powerless 
to win the battle against some of the corrupted leaders and businessmen. This typical case is of 
interest for Albania. When the governmental institutions suffer from the “disease” called “the 
systematic corruption” the majority of the people suffer loss, while the corrupted politicians, 
businessmen and clerks make huge benefits. The systematic corruption consists of two 
components: the centralized and decentralized corruption, where the former component is the 
most important. The strategy of anticorruption system is focused in the corruption system and 
not only in the individuals, who don’t respect the state laws and the credibility given. We should 
think that this war must be focused on systems that are tangible and suspected of doing illegal 
activity (for example, the justice system, the education system, the health system, the bank 
system, etc.)  
Two essential factors in the survival of the corruption are the absence of monitoring the behavior 
of the officials by using indicators and the lack of political will to penalize corruptive activities.A 
very important factor influencing the efficiency of the anticorruption system is the probability of 
detecting the corruptive activity through the inside and outside controls. The greater the 
probability, the more effective the war against corruption will be. In order to evaluate the 
probability of detecting corruption mathematically, a set of indicators of corruption, proposed in 
the Theory of Modern Corruption and Criminology will be used.  
 
2. INDICATORS OF CORRUPTION 
The indicators of corruption are not really obvious. They provide different contributions 
in the detection and punishment of the corruptive activities, meaning that some of these 
indicators are more important than others. If these indicators recur or are combined with each-
other, then they will help not only in the raising of suspicion, but also in the beginning of the 
proper penal procedures against the government official accused of corruption. 
 A subset of the anticorruption indicators set should never be used in any anticorruption 
control, because this may minimize the real level of the corruption activity. There are two kind of 
corruption indicators: neutral indicators and specific indicators.  
2.1 Neutral indicators of corruption  
The neutral indicators of corruption are examined by the behavior of the government 
officials at the workplace and outside of it. These indicators are considered acceptable by the 
social opinion as well. The neutral indicators of corruption observed more often during 
corruption activities throughout the last three decades in different states are listed below:   
1.The unjustified amount of wealth through legal means. An unexplained change in the living 
standard. A luxury living, that cannot be provided through the personal or family income. For 
example, building or buying a private home, or purchasing of a second home or apartment by the 
seaside, buying of an expensive car, excessive expenses, for holidays and different 
entertainment, especially gambling. 
2. Social and personal issues like nepotism, strong dependence or obligations towards another 
person; 
3. A second employment outside of the institution which is very similar to the government job 
(i.e. which is against the institutional interests).  
4. Acceptance of different invitations by businessmen to spend weekend in villas or luxury  
hotels, lunches, dinners in expensive restaurants, private visits to companies, or international 
fairs, etc. 
5. Unusual special agreements to buy things or services, extreme discounts or favors for the 
payback period.  
6. Excessive generosity in sending gifts (addressed to homes); fake generosity towards the boss.  
7. Frequent participation in private meetings with bosses, people who make offers, (businessmen 
participators in tenders), participation in private or business events. 
8. Allows himself to be needful at the workplace; for example goes to work even though he is 
sick, to avoid situations that other workers know in detail about “stunts” he has done. 
9. Fraudulent (for example, a politician frauds in the declaration of a property; a justice police 
officers frauds by distorting the fact of an investigation).  
10. Takes home important work documents. 
11. Correct treatment of difficult or delicate cases, though the official has no theoretical-
scientific background, the necessary training and work experience.  
12. Unexplained loneliness, talks less to his bosses and directors  
13. An immediate change of the personal opinion; for example supporting a project which 
previously he had opposed.  
14.  Baseless refusal to do a reevaluation or advancement of work, especially when these have to 
do with technical, technological and methodological advancement.  
15. Lack of complaints or conflicts when these are common or expected. 
16. Unusual tone of voice or careless with bosses, directors or subordinates. 
 
2.2 Specific indicators of corruption 
Unlike the neutral indicators of corruption, the specific indicators of corruption must be 
considered as signals or warning signs, which must lead to the increase of suspicion for the 
existence of legal irregularities or trespassing. 
The experience of corruption in other states of the world throughout the decades suggests that the 
specific corruption indicators observed more often in the corruptive activities are these:  
17.Inexplicable decisions that were never made before in the same way. 
18. Different evaluations or treatments of cases that have similar data. 
19. Misuse or biased interpretation of the personal power of freedom of judgment or action.  
20. Lack of performing controls or reviews, even though they are reasonably needed. 
21. Manipulation of the treatment of a case which has been previously studied and evaluated by 
other officials inside of the institution.  
22. Overriding of the boss' authority on critical cases and unacceptable extension of legal power.  
23. Repeated practice of meeting outside the institution without a credible explanation about 
their relevance to the work.  
24. Preference to repeat the support of some participants in tenders. 
25. Entering in negotiations that are not in favor of the institution.  
26. Lack of responsibility during the talks about the contracts.  
27. Lack of receipts for the payment of services, or lack of official stamp in all the official 
correspondence with participants in tenders or other contractors.  
28. Complaints by the contractors or participants in tenders, where irregularities in the 
procedures implemented by the government officials are noticed, especially in cases when these 
complaints have been disregarded by the respective public institution.  
29. Disappearing or hiding of decision-making documentation, important contracts, or other 
inspections done.  
30. The government official plays an unfair game with one or more clients. 
31. Regular visits of some businessmen, contractors or clients in the office of the government 
official.  
32. Open discussions of some government officials in confidential environments, displayed by 
the improper behavior, which will result into personal benefit, if it is used.  
33. Tendency to procrastinate certain controls or estimates.  
34. Notable company, private meetings of the government official with criminals, or former 
prisoners, mafia and corrupted people.  
35. Opposition or disregard of the government official towards the charges and accusations 
brought by certain individuals, companies or institutions.  
36. Unexplained revelations of confidential information by the government official.  
37. Approval of an order or instruction given by the directors that a critical case be treated like 
an ordinary one.  
38. Disregard for the suspicion about the application of the law in the previous works. 
39. Unexplainable speeding or slowing down or interruption of a case.  
40. Weakening of the inner control; for example, the closing of a useful institutional department 
or the allowance of some officials to become independent.  
41. Overlooking of tenders; lack of variety in their offers.  
42. Request to purchase and install old ineffective technology at more expensive prices than the 
ones in the market.  
43. More expensive purchases than the ones offered by the stock exchange; double receipts. 
44. Rapid changes and frequent purposeful mathematical calculations in the contract or tender 
documentation.  
45. Corruptive stains from the past of this government official. 
46. Powerful sponsoring (even simultaneous) of several main political parties in election 
campaigns by private companies or businessmen.  
47. Unexplainable and purposeful obstacles by the government official of the investment or the 
domestic production in a specific area, because personal benefit interests or monopoly interests 
might be threatened.  
In the above lists we have listed 16 neutral indicators and 31specific indicators of corruption, 
altogether amounting to 47. 
Practically, it could be difficult or even unachievable to control all this corruption indicators  for 
each government official. Therefore it make sense  to use the so-called “monitoring level” of 
corruption, which is equal to the divisor of the number of indicators controlled over the general 
number of the indicators of corruption. It is clear that the level of corruption monitoring for each 
official is a number between 0-1. the 0 value of the monitoring level indicates the complete lack 
of monitoring of these official's corruption activity. In this case, though the official may be 
corrupted, chances are equal to zero to discover any corruption thereby. The 1 value of the 
monitoring level indicated the complete monitoring of the corruption activity of this official. In 
this case chances for discovering the corruption activity are higher and with a lot of clarity 
whether this official is honest or corrupted. Intuitively, it makes sense that the higher the 
monitoring level of an official's corruption, the greater the probability of detecting the corruption 
done by him/her (if he/she is corrupted). In the following paragraph, this statement will be 
illustrated and proved mathematically. 
An important conclusion of the corruption indicators monitoring is the creation of an adverse 
anticorruption environment.  
 
3. THE PROBABILITY OF DETECTING CORRUPTION 
An ordinary official is examined in the government sector; for example a minister, a mayor, tax 
inspector, customs officer, judge, prosecutor, university professor, etc. his activity will be 
monitored through the 47 corruption indicators. Suppose that indicator nr: Let's call  
−kA the event that this official is corrupted.  
𝐴𝑘
′ – the opposite of the event.  
−= kk pAP )( the probability of the event 𝐴𝑘 
It is thought that in the activity of this official m corruption indicators are noticed, whereas (4-m) 
other indicators are not noticed. In order not to overload our study with mathematical symbols, 
these m indicators will be renumbered/ recalculated 1,2,...m respecting this supposition and 
renumbering, we will use the following numbered; 
−kB the event of the case that an official be corrupted, if in his activity indicators have been 
noticed. 
−'kB the opposite of  the event kB , për 471 ≤≤≤ mk  
−A the event that the official is corrupted, if in his activity have been noticed m indicators of 
corruption  
−'A the opposite of the event  −kA  
−= kk pBP )( Probability that the official is corrupted.  
C – the event that the corruption of this person be detected by the anticorruption group (for 
example by the Corruption Investigation Bureau within the Institution or the National 
Anticorruption Agency or the Superior State control or by SHISH).  
P(C/A) indicates the conditional probability, whereas the )( ACP ∩  indicates the unconditional 
probability of the government official examined. 
The result is 
mBBBA ∪∪∪= 21 . 
Applying the conditional probability formula we find that: 
 ).  |()|()()  ()( ' 1
'
2
'
1
''
1
'
2
'
1
''
2
'
1
'
−∩∩⋅=∩∩= mmm BBBBPBBPBPBBBPAP   
As a result we will have 
)  |()|()(1)( ' 1
'
2
'
1
''
1
'
2
'
1 −∩∩⋅−= mm BBBBPBBPBPAP     (1) 
If in formula (1) we apply De Morgan’s Rule or the Duality Principle of S. N. Bernstejn, 
then we obtain the conditional probability formula: 
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Therefore the evaluation of probability is very important 21  ( BBP ∪ ), 321( BBBP ∪∪ ), … , 
)( 121 mm BBBBP ∪∪∪∪ − . 
If  mBBB  , , , 21    are independent random events, then formula (1) takes a compact form:  
)1()1()1(1)( 21 mpppAP −−⋅−−=        (2) 
For a detailed study of the conditional probability and the independences of the random events 
see [6].  
Experts on the field of the activity that the official does in corporation with professors of the 
Theory of Probability use the statistical or subjective definition of probability to evaluate the 
probabilities 
 mppp   ,    ,  , 21   dhe 21  ( BBP ∪ ), 321( BBBP ∪∪ ) ,  ...  , )( 121 mm BBBBP ∪∪∪∪ − . 
Since in our country no regular statistical data for the discovery of corruption through 
monitoring are provided, it results that the subjective definition will be used for the evaluation of 
the above mentioned probabilities (the so- called the Method of Von Musses- Kollmogorov) see 
[6]. According to this method, experts of different fields use the experience in work, opinions 
and other personal information to evaluate the probabilities 4721   ,    ,  , ppp  ., this means that 
the estimation of probability pk by one expert expresses his belief about the reality of the 
equality/equation kk pBP =)( .  
The subjective probabilities 4721   ,    ,  , ppp  change occasionally from expert to expert.  
These probabilities are otherwise called personal probabilities. After the estimates are made by 
the experts about the above mentioned probabilities, they get elaborated statistically and in this 
way the desired results are obtained. 
  
Referring to the list of 47 corruption indicators, we suggest this guiding preliminary estimate of 
the probabilities 4746321  , ,   ,  , , ppppp  : 
9.01 =p  6.02 =p  9.03 =p  5.04 =p  8.05 =p  
2.06 =p  4.07 =p  5.08 =p  9.09 =p  3.010 =p  
4.011 =p  1.012 =p  6.013 =p  3.014 =p  3.015 =p  
4.016 =p  8.017 =p  8.018 =p  9.019 =p  8.020 =p  
8.021 =p  8.022 =p  2.023 =p  7.024 =p  8.025 =p  
3.026 =p  8.027 =p  6.028 =p  9.029 =p  8.030 =p  
2.031 =p  5.032 =p  3.033 =p  9.034 =p  5.035 =p  
9.036 =p  8.037 =p  6.038 =p  8.039 =p  5.040 =p  
6.041 =p  8.042 =p  9.043 =p  9.044 =p  8.045 =p  
8.046 =p  9.047 =p     
The formula of multiplication of probability is true.  
  )|()()( ACPAPCAP ⋅=∩         (3)  
I emphasize that the conditional probability of the detection of corruption depends on the level of 
professionalism, dedication to work and integrity of the anticorruption system workers. The 
extreme values (limiting) of this conditional probability are; 
1)|( ≈ACP ( high level of professionalism, dedication to work and honesty). 
0)|( ≈ACP     ( anticorruption system is completely corrupted). 
A direct consequence of the formula (1), (2), (3), is this: if together with the corruption indicators 
previously monitored another corruption indicator will be monitored, then the unconditional 
probability of the detecting of corruption shall increase.  
Remark 1. The set of corruption indicators is dynamic, because the probabilities 4721  , ... , , ppp  
change as time goes by. Therefore these probabilities need to be reevaluated by experts every 
other year. The completer the information the more effective the application of the statistical 
definition to evaluate the probabilities 4721  , ... , , ppp  is. The dependence of the assertion 
(statement), is deducted by the Kollomogorov Teory of the stability  relative (see [16]). 
Remark 2. Some of the subjective probabilities 4721  , ... , , ppp may change and depending on 
the profession of the official like customs worker, tax inspector, university professor, police 
officer, prosecutor, etc. these specifications are useful and needed to be made by the expert's 
group.  
The mathematical model of this study consists of four components:  
1. The probability that the government official monitored is corrupted. 
2. The probability that his corruption is detected. 
3. The probability that the official be charged, on condition that his corruption be brought 
to light.  
4. The probability that the official be penalized, on the condition that he is legally 
charged for proved corruption.  
The first and second components are related to the anticorruption body, whereas the fourth is 
related to the court. 
Another important application of this study is the calculation of the unconditional 
probability of the penalization of corruption.  
Suppose that p, q, r, s are the probabilities of the four above mentioned components, whereas P 
is the probability without the condition of punishment of the official with the accusation for 
corruption. 
srqpP ⋅⋅⋅=         (4) 
This formula shows that the probability without this condition is small, if the corruption is 
present in the anticorruption system, prosecution, court. It is important to be emphasized that the 
corruption of the anticorruption official, the prosecutor or the judge be brought to light as well 
through the 47 corruption indicators as well.  
Example 
Throughout the monitoring process of an official's activity in government by means of the 47 
corruption indicators, only indicators with ordinal numbers  2, 15, 18, and 29 have been noticed.  
I. That the probability of the random event that this official is corrupted is calculated. 
II. That the probability without the condition of the detection of corruption of this 
official, given that the probability with the condition of the corruption detection be equal 
to 0.4 is calculated.  
III. That the probability without the condition of charging the official for corruption, 
given that this probability with the condition of charging the official has the value of 0.8 
is calculated.  
IV . That the probability without the condition that this official is charged, given that the 
value of this probability is calculated 0.5.  
Solution  
Indicators of corruption with the ordinal numbers 2, 15, 18, and 29 correspond respectively to the 
occasional events 2A , 15A , 18A  dhe 29A . It is noticed that these events are independent among 
themselves, from the perspective of the Theory of Probability. Based on the preliminary 
evaluation of the corruption indicators probabilities, the respective values are found as follows; 
I. The probability that this official be corrupted is calculated with the following f 
formula (2). 
6.02 =p , 3.015 =p , 8.018 =p , 9.029 =p . 
II. The probability without the condition of the detection of corruption of this officialis 
calculated with the formula (3): 
398.04.09944.0 =⋅  
III. The probability without the condition of the accusation of this official for corruption 
is calculated with the analogous formula: 
3184.08.04.09944.0 =⋅⋅  
IV. The probability without the condition of the penalizing of the official for corruption is 
calculated with the formula (4): 
 P = 1592.05.08.04.09944.0 =⋅⋅⋅ . 
The interpretation of the results for this example 
p = 0.9944  shows that this official is practically corrupted , whereas P=0.159.... shows 
that the probability without the condition of the penalty of this official is really small.  
This negative phenomenon (meaning, the minimal penalty amount of corruption) is caused by 
the fact that the corruption in this example is present in some fields; practically in the 
anticorruption body and in the court. We emphasize that it is worth exercising with the 
probabilities of this example p and P, even though the numerical data of the probabilities with 
the condition q,r,s, are only hypothetical.  
Conclusion 
1. The detection and punishment of corruption through the monitoring of the behavior of state 
officials and politicians using indicators, based on the formulas 1 & 4 is a scientific method, 
which combines a contemporary achievement of the Scientific Research in Criminology with the 
theory of Probability.  This scientific method is powerful, universal, because it can be applied in 
every field (economy, judicial system, ministries, town halls, education, health ) and in every 
period of time, punishing according to the law corrupted people regardless of their political 
convictions, social status, gender, age, personal income, or history of their corruptive activities. 
The corruption indicators include facts that are real. They are not simply suppositions or 
hypothesis. Therefore these indicators have investigative power. Because of the monitoring of 
the 47 corruption indicators, this scientific method results as successful to detect and punish the 
sophisticated corruption activity. 
2. Two very important factors of the corruption system survival are the lack of corruption 
indicators’ monitoring and the lack of political will to punish corruptive activity. The monitoring 
through corruption indicators should be done from the top to the bottom (for example from the 
minister to the ordinary employees, or from the general prosecutor to the police officers in the 
municipalities). Corruption survives unless uprooted in all segments of the government. 
Malaysia Indonesia, Nicaragua, and Brazil have offered specific  examples of evidence of total 
failure of the war against the corruption system in the 80’s because the corruption was not 
uprooted, though corrupted ministries, mayors, prosecutors and judges were punished hard.  
3. The detection and punishment of the corruptive activity, in essence, are random events. 
Therefore it is reasonable and useful to use calculations for the detection and punishment of the 
corruptive activity. 
4. The originality of this study is in the application of some formulas for the calculation of 
probability for the detection of this corruption, through the monitoring of state officials using 
indicators.  
5. The corruption indicators are not equally important, because some of these indicators 
contribute more than the others in the detection of corruptive activity.  
6. The decision for the monitoring of state officials using corruption indicators shall be taken by 
the Prime minister, whereas its implementation and application may be done by the National 
Anticorruption Agency in collaboration with the Anticorruption Bureaus in the respective 
ministries, city halls, prosecuting offices, courts and the Superior State Control. If the monitoring 
shall not be done in all the territory of the Republic of Albania or will not be consistent or will be 
done ineffectively, then the war against corruption will result in loss. The worse shameful case is 
when a considerable part of officials in the anticorruption system become corrupted. Therefore it 
is important especially to monitor the anticorruption agents themselves against corruption. The 
quality of monitoring of the corruption indicators is really crucial to win the war against 
corruption. This quality is also a measurement of independence of the anticorruption system 
activity from interventions of corrupted politicians or businessmen. This monitoring must be 
done with great honesty and responsibility.  
7. The practical application of this study requires a preliminary evaluation of the 4721  , ... , , ppp
and 21  ( BBP ∪ ),... , )( 121 mm BBBBP ∪∪∪∪ − probabilities as  well as probabilities with the 
condition that q, r, s, of formula (4). Since in our country no such thing as regular data is 
available to detect, accuse and punish corruption through monitoring of corruption indicators, it 
is logical that for the evaluation of the above mentioned probabilities the Von Mises- 
Kollmogorov (used for the subject probabilities) should be used. This preliminary evaluation 
would be done for a group of math experts and professors. Specialist from the Head Bureau, 
Ministries, the Superior Government Control and other professors of Tirana University are 
expected to be the adequate expert candidates.  
8. Direct impacts of this study are the increase of the probability of detecting corruption and the 
unconditional probability of the punishment of the corrupted officials. As result, officials with 
corruptive tendencies, when monitored through the corruption indicators; even when they are 
involved in corruptive activity, will be detected and punished according to the law. The practical 
application of this study will enable within a few year the change of general perception on 
corruption “from a small-risk, with a huge benefit activity” to “a high-risk, no benefit activity”. 
9. If corruption is low levels for all the administration for a ten year period of time, then a 
trajectory (curve) would be generated that would show the stability of low level of corruption.  
10.This study must be applied especially in those systems where the corruption destroys the 
economic development and damages the function of main state institution (for example, in the 
customs, taxes, property rights, property titles, ministries...) special attention must be shown to 
the politician's activity. After collecting the monitoring data, the Math Statistical method of some 
statistical hypotheses must be used. For example, 
Ho: Albanian politicians are not corrupted. 
Ha: Albanian politicians are corrupted.         or 
Ho: less than 30% of the Albanian politicians are corrupted. 
Ha: not less than 30% of the Albanian politicians are corrupted.     or 
Ho: Albanian politicians are less corrupted than other people. 
Ha: Albanian politicians aren't less corrupted than other people. 
The proposal for the above-mentioned statistical hypothesis control is based on the 
contemporary scientific research for the detection of corruption in some European countries (see 
[2], [12], [13]). 
11. The corruption survival is often disputed through the principle of the negative collective 
reputation of generations; young people inherit a bad reputation from old corrupted persons. As a 
result part of the young generation is influenced by the corruptive experience of the older 
generation. As a direct result of this argument there is a considerable amount of students infected 
by corruption. You can imagine the damage in families and all the Albanian society, caused by 
this kind of corruption. The mathematical results presented in this study must be applied also for 
this kind of corruption. 
12. Some authors define corruption as any kind of abuse of government, state position, to 
provide for personal benefits (see [1], [2]). Though this definition enables the judicial analysis of 
a wide set of corruptive activity, unfortunately it leaves out some evil strategies based on legal 
agreements made in the parliament or the previous government, which generate corruption. 
Regardless of these shortages, which can be present even in Albania, the monitoring methods of 
the corruption indicators allow the calculation of the probability of detecting corruption. 
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